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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
BARBARA KELLY,

)
)
)
)

Claimant-Appellant,
V.

)

BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.,
Employer, and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, Surety,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING AUGMENTATION
OF THE RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 42658-2014
Industrial Commission No.
IC 2013-024694
Ref 15-390

An AUGMENTATION OF THE RECORD with attachments was filed by counsel for
Appellant on September 1, 2015. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's AUGMENTATION OF THE RECORD be
and hereby is, GRANTED, and the appeal record shall include the document listed below, a copy of
which accompanied the Motion, which shall be added to the scanned record:
1.

Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Recommendation from the State
Industrial Commission.

DATED this

f f day of September, 2015.
By Order of the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
Industrial Commission Secretary

ORDER GRANTING AUGMENTATION OF THE RECORD Docket No. 42658-2014
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF

STATE OF IDAHO

BARBARA KELLY,
IC 2013-024694

Claimant,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSION OF LAW,
AND RECOMMENDATION

V.

BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.,
Employer,
and
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the
above-entitled matter to Referee Michael Powers.

In lieu of a hearing, the parties

submitted the issue for resolution on a Stipulation of Facts and briefing.

Michael

Kessinger of Lewiston represented Claimant, and Wynn Mosman of Moscow represented
Defendants. The matter came under advisement on May 29, 2014.
ISSUE

The sole issue to be decided is whether Claimant is entitled to applicable workers'
compensation benefits for injuries suffered in an automobile accident while returning from
an IME scheduled by Surety related to Claimant's ongoing workers' compensation claim.
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SYNOPSIS OF CASE AND CONTENTIONS OF

PARTIES

On September 16, 2013, Claimant suffered a covered industrial accident while
working for Employer.

Pursuant to the ensuing workers' compensation claim, Surety

ordered Claimant to attend an IME in Post Falls, Idaho on November 15, 2013. On her
return trip home to Lewiston from the IME, Claimant was involved in an automobile
accident, which resulted in further injuries.
The parties dispute whether Claimant's injuries sustained in the auto accident would
be subject to workers' compensation benefits.

Claimant argues under the theory of

"compensable consequences" the injuries would be covered. Defendants argue the accident
was an "intervening, independent, responsible, and culminating cause" and therefore not
subject to workers' compensation coverage.
RECORD FOR REVIEW
The record in this matter consists of the Stipulation of Facts and legal briefing
submitted by the parties.
After having considered the facts and legal briefs of the parties, the Referee submits
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law for review by the Commission.
STIPULATED FACTS
The undisputed and stipulated facts are set forth below verbatim from the parties'
Stipulation of Facts.
1.

On September 16, 2013, Claimant Barbara Kelly (hereafter Claimant) was an

employee of Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc. (hereafter Blue Ribbon), in Lewiston, Idaho.
At said time, Blue Ribbon was insured for its obligations under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act by the Idaho State Insurance Fund (hereafter Surety).
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2.

On or about September 16, 2013, Claimant, Employer, and Surety were

subject to the provisions ofidaho's Worker's Compensation Law.
3.

Claimant suffered a compensable workers' compensation injury when a cart

rolled over her left foot while in the course and scope of her employment with Blue
Ribbon on September 16, 2013.
4.

Surety paid medical and time loss benefits to Claimant as a result of the

injury to her left foot.
5.

On or about November 8, 2013, Julie Estes, an agent of Surety, sent Claimant

a letter, which read as follows:
We [Surety] have arranged for you to be seen in an
independent medical evaluation with Robert Friedman. This
appointment is scheduled for November 15, 2013, at 1: 00 p.m.
and will be held at Kootenai Health Plaza, which is located at
1300 East Mullan Avenue, Post Falls, Idaho.
Please make the necessary arrangements to keep this
appointment and bring copies of all x-rays/MRI films with
you. Failure to do so may result in the termination of benefits
and the responsibility for any "no show" charges.
You may submit a report of all travel expenses to this office
for reimbursement. This should include the date traveled,
destination, and round trip mileage.
6.

It is approximately 125 miles each way from Claimant's workplace m

Lewiston, Idaho, to Post Falls, Idaho.
7.

Dr. Robert Friedman performs medical evaluations in Lewiston, Idaho.

Appointments with Dr. Friedman were available in November in Post Falls and in
December in Lewiston.

Claimant was scheduled for the November appointment in Post

Falls.
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8.

On November 15, 2013, Claimant traveled to Post Falls, Idaho, for the

surety-scheduled medical evaluation.

On said date she was still an employee of Blue

Ribbon and was receiving time loss benefits from Surety.
9.

Directly after meeting with Dr. Friedman, Claimant began her return trip

from Post Falls, Idaho, to Lewiston.
10.

Claimant did not make any stops or take any detours on her way home from

the appointment with Dr. Friedman.
11.

At 3:50 p.m. on November 15, 2013, on US 95 approximately five miles

south of Potlatch, it was snowing and the road was covered with snow. At said location,
Claimant was southbound in her Ford Expedition when a northbound Ford Fl50 lost
traction, crossed the centerline, and collided head-on with Claimant's vehicle. Claimant's
actions did not cause or contribute to the collision.
12.

As a result of the automobile collision, Claimant suffered severe physical

injuries to her lower extremities.

Due to the extent of her injuries, Claimant's doctor

restricted her from any weight-bearing on her lower extremities until further notice. As a
result of the crash, Claimant was in a skilled nursing facility in Lewiston, Idaho, until
February 28, 2014.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS
13.

The provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally

construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955,
956, 793 P.2d 187, 188 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for
narrow, technical construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760
(1996).
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Arguments in Javor of applying the compensable consequence doctrine to the
facts
14.

Claimant relies on the doctrine of compensable consequence as set forth by

Professor Larson in his treatise Larson's Workers' Compensation Law. (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed.) to support her argument in favor of coverage for injuries she sustained in the
November 2013 automobile accident. The doctrine states:
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an
aggravation of the original injury or a new· and distinct injury,
is compensable if it is the direct and natural result of a
compensable primary injury. 1
1 Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation § 10.01 (Matthew· Bender, Rev. Ed.
2014).
15.

This concept is easy to apply when the subsequent injury is a complication of

the primary injury, or treatment of the primary injury leads to a second injury. It is less
clear how an accident such as the one in question complies with the requirement under
Idaho law that to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an accident arising out of
and in the course of employment. An injury is received in the course qf the employment
when it comes while Claimant is doing the duty which she is employed to perform.

It

arises out of the employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind upon
consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under
which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Eriksen v. Nez Perce

1

In her briefing Claimant cited as authority the following introductory language for the chapter on compensable
consequences: "When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every
natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an
independent intervening cause contributable to the claimant's own intentional conduct." Claimant excluded the next
sentence of the introduction, which states; "More specifically, the progressive worsening or complication ofa workconnected injury remains compensable so long as the worsening is not shown to have been produced by an
intervening nonindustrial cause."
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County, 72 Idaho 1, 6,235 P.2d 736,738 (1951). Professor Larson realized the second

injury might not comply with the requirement that the injury must arise out of and in the
course of the employment, so he created a concept called "quasi-course of employment" to
deal with this reality. As he describes it:
[s]ince in the strict sense, none of the consequential injuries we
are concerned with are in the course of employment, it
becomes necessary to contrive a new concept, which we may
for convenience call "quasi-course of employment." By this
expression is meant activities undertaken by the employee
following upon his or her injury which, although they take
place outside the time and space limits of the employment, and
would not be considered employment activities for the usual
purposes, are nevertheless related to the employment in the
sense that they are necessary or reasonable activities that
would not have been undertaken but for the compensable
mJury.
1 Lex K. Larson, Larson's FVorkers' Cornpensation § 10.05 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.
2014). Applying this "quasi-course of employment" concept, Professor Larson argues that
when the second injury arises out of a quasi-course activity, such as a trip to the doctor's
office, the chain of causation should only be deemed broken by the claimant's intentional
conduct prohibited by the employer. Id.
16.

When applying the concept of compensable consequences, the Commission2

has observed:
the application of this rule is almost entirely limited to
situations where a primary work-related injury is followed by a
later non work-related injury. The rule is remedial in nature;
its purpose, under such circumstances, is to assure the worker
is compensated for the later, non work-related injury by
providing that such an injury 'likewise arises out of
employment.'

2

The Idaho Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of compensable consequences in a workers' compensation
setting.
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Keith v. Connors Logging, Inc. 1990 IIC 0660 at 0660.5. Claimant argues this approach is

similar to Professor Larson's "quasi-course of employment" standard.
17.

Neither the Commission nor the Idaho Supreme Court has formally adopted

Professor Larson's "quasi-course of employment" proposal. However, as noted in Lee v.
JR. Simplot Co., 1996 IIC 0019, "historically, Idaho has followed the natural consequence

theory of compensability of subsequent injuries." In Lee, the Referee found the claimant
was engaged in a retraining program agreed to by Defendant when she developed upper
extremity issues. There was no intervening cause for the complaints. Therefore, Claimant
was entitled to medical benefits for the upper extremity problems she developed while
undergoing vocational rehabilitation. Lee at 0019 .4
18.

Claimant argues

another way to

consider the

applicability of the

compensable consequences doctrine in the present case is under the implied contract
theory, as articulated in Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130, 379 P.2d 217
(1963), and cited with approval in Larson. Therein, the Kansas court reasoned that because
the employer is obligated to furnish medical care to the injured employee, and the
employee was under a duty to submit to reasonable medical treatment as directed by the
workers' compensation statutes, the provisions of the act become an implied part of the
employment contract.

Accordingly, accidental injuries occurring during trips made

pursuant to the act are work connected.
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19.

Claimant points out a significant number of jurisdictions follow the rule that

injuries occasioned while traveling to and from a doctor's office for workers' compensation
related treatment or examination are covered for workers' compensation benefits. 3
20.

Finally, Claimant notes Idaho's contrary case, Kiger v The Idaho Corp. 85

Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963), was decided prior to Idaho's comprehensive revision of
the workers' compensation laws, and prior to the Commission's use of the compensable
consequences doctrine.

Claimant argues Kiger (discussed in greater detail below) is

distinguishable because in that case, the claimant set her own doctor's appointment, and
was not compelled to attend an appointment when and where directed by Surety.
addition, claimant therein was not compensated for her trip.

In

Claimant asserts Kiger 1s

inconsistent with the current state of the Commission rulings since at least 1990.

Arguments against applying the compensable consequence doctrine to the present facts
21.

Defendants' chief argument centers around the fact the Idaho Supreme Court

rejected the notion that an automobile accident occurring while Claimant was traveling to
or from medical treatment would be a loss covered under the workers' compensation laws
of this state. The issue was examined in Kiger v. the Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 3 80
P.2d 208 (1963). Therein, the claimant was injured in an auto accident while driving to her
doctor's office for treatment of a prior workers' compensation injury. She unsuccessfully
sought from the Industrial Accident Board (now Industrial Commission) compensation and
medical expenses resulting from the automobile accident.

She appealed the adverse

3

Larson lists the following jurisdictions as having so held: California, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, Colorado,
Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Mississippi, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Virginia, New Jersey, New York, and Maryland.
However, Maryland reversed the cited decision, and does not provide coverage for such accidents. See, Mackin &
Assoc. v. Harris, 672 A.2d 11 IO (Md. 1996). Conversely, this is not a comprehensive list of states providing such
coverage, but only those states listed in Larson, which is not current. The point is many states allow for such
coverage.
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decision. Quoting from the Oklahoma decision of Farmers' Gin Co. v. Cooper, 147 Okl.
29, 294 P. 108 (1930),

Kiger Court found the automobile accident "was in no sense due

to the employment, nor did it result from a risk reasonably incident to the employment and
there is a severance rather than a causal connection between the conditions under which the
work was required to be performed and the resulting injury." Further, citing to Linder v.
City of Payette, 64 Idaho 656, 135 P.2d 440 (1943), the Supreme Court reiterated "that if

there occurs, after the initial accident and injury, an intervening, independent, responsible,
and culminating cause, the latter occurrence becomes the proximate cause." Concluding as
a matter of law the automobile accident in question did not arise out of and in the course of
claimant's employment, the Court affirmed the decision.
22.

Defendants argue that while Claimant herein is critical of the Kiger decision,

it is still the law in Idaho, and carries controlling weight unless and until it is overruled.
Furthermore, it is consistent with several other states, including Wyoming, Ohio, and
Michigan. 4

Analysis and Holding
23.

In addition to the binding effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Kiger,

there are good policy reasons to deny Claimant's bid for compensation from the subject
auto accident.

Professor Larson's argument is grounded in the notion that the "but for"

connection is sufficient to allow compensation for secondary injuries in all cases where the
injury is not occasioned by a claimant's intentional wrongful conduct. This standard is too
broad.

Not only does it require the adoption of the concept of "quasi-course of

4

As noted previously, Maryland also rejects the notion of coverage for a claimant's trip to and from the doctor's
office. Oklahoma too, as cited by the Court in Kiger appears to reject the concept. This is not meant to be a
comprehensive review of rejecting states; the point is several states have not adopted the proposition.
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employment," a legal fiction which has not been recognized in Idaho, but its literal
application could well lead to an almost unlimited scope of coverage. As pointed out in

Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373 (Wyo.
1997), which is almost factually identical to the present case (except the auto accident
therein resulted in the claimant's death):
it would be impossible to ever cut off compensability if we
were to adopt the hearing examiner's interpretation of the
causation requirement. Would we compensate an employee
who wrecked her car and died because she fell asleep at the
wheel while she was on her way to see her doctor? Would we
compensate an employee who was killed by a drunk driver
while she was on her way home from her doctor's
appointment? A logical end would not exist to the causation
test which the hearing examiner purposes. Furthermore, it
would lead to too many abuses, and the worker's compensation
fund would, in effect, become a general health and accident
insurance fund, a purpose for which it was not intended.
A causal connection does not exist between the
employee's initial injury and her car accident. The fact that
she was returning from a doctor's appointment for an injury
which she sustained while she was working [for employer]
does not translate to a finding that the [work-related] injury
caused her death. Certainly, the accident which caused the
employee's death did not occur because of her work related
back injury. The accident was not a hazard of her employment
that she would not have been subjected to apart from her job
nor did it result from a risk reasonably incident to the character
of the business. Rather, the accident resulted from a hazard
that we are all equally exposed to bad road conditions.

Id. at 377-378. The Bruhn Court also examined, and expressly rejected, the concept of
quasi-course of employment.

Instead, it held that in order for a second injury to be

compensable, the original compensable injury must be a direct cause of the subsequent
injury. Id. at 3 78.
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24.

The Marv; land court in 1Hackin & Assoc. v. Harris, 672 A.2d 1110 (Md.
.

1996) also considered and rejected the carte blanche application of Larson's scope of
compensable consequences.

The A1ackin court reversed a lower court ruling granting

workers' compensation benefits for an injury that occurred when claimant fell on an icy
sidewalk while making his way to his physical therapist's office for treatment due to a
prior industrial accident. In reversing, the court found there was an insufficient legal nexus
between the first accident and the second to support an additional compensation award. In
reaching this decision, the court rejected what it called Larson's "contrived" quasi-course
of employment theory, opting for a rule that to be compensable, the second injury must be
a direct and natural result of the earlier injury. The court was critical of the notion that a
second injury will always be compensable if it can be shown that it would not have
occurred "but for" the first injury. The court listed several hypothetical "legally absurd"
situations which could arise from this expansive use of the "but for" test. In one typical
example, the court noted that one could argue that "but for" the fact a claimant was off
work from an industrial accident, he would not have been at home at the time he tripped
over the garden hose and injured himself.

The M~ackin Court went on to illustrate two

actual cases from Florida, where the "but for" test is applied broadly.

In Dept. of

Transportation v. King, 554 So.2d 1192 (Fla.App. 1989), the claimant received benefits
after being struck by a car while she was out walking. She claimed her doctor instructed
her to take walks in an effort to promote healing of her industrial leg injury, and "but for"
her initial injury, she would not have been outside walking at that moment. Likewise, in

Little Caesar's v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.App. 1990), the claimant received benefits
after his involvement in an auto accident occurring while he was driving home from a park
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where he had been sw1mmmg.

He claimed he was swimming to help him regarn his

strength, pursuant to doctor's instructions, after his original industrial accident.

The

Maryland court pointed out cases such as these lack a sufficient nexus between the original
injury and the ensuing harm, but are allowed under a strict "but for" analysis. The A1ackin
court found the better rule is that the claimant must establish a direct causal connection
between the original industrial injury and the subsequent injury or condition. 672 A.2d
1114.
25.

While the Idaho Industrial Commission has applied the concept of

compensable consequences since at least 1990, it has always done so in relation to a second
injury being directly and causally tied to the initial compensable injury. For example, in

Castaneda v. Idaho Home Health, Inc., 1999 IIC 0857, the Commission found the
claimant's right elbow epicondylitis resulted from her inability to properly use her right
arm after she broke her right shoulder in an industrial accident. See also, e.g. Nelson v.

First Interstate Bank 2000 IIC 0914 ( overuse syndrome in right shoulder direct result of
left shoulder injury); Offer v. Clearwater Forest Industries 2000 IIC 0956 (right shoulder
injury led to overuse and injury of left shoulder); Quentin2003 v. American Interstate Ins.

Co., 2003 IIC 023 7 (low back and left leg injuries resulted due to limping caused by right
knee industrial accident). In short, the Idaho cases have consistently found a direct and
natural causative link between the original industrial injury and the compensable
consequence injury or condition.
26.

Conversely, in Vaught v. Mervyn 's 1999 IIC 1284, the claimant was denied

benefits for a seizure because the Commission found her decision to stop taking her
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medication served as an independent, intervening cause, thus breaking the causal chain and
barring her from recovery.
27.

In the present case, there is no causal connection between the original

industrial injury and the subsequent injuries suffered in the automobile accident. Claimant
does not argue her original injury in any way contributed to the accident, or her subsequent
injuries. In cases where the Commission has applied compensable consequence as a theory
for recovery, the first injury was material to the analysis; the nature of the first injury was
directly linked to the onset of the second injury. To apply the concept of compensable
consequence to these facts would greatly expand the scope of its application.
28.

Claimant's argument can be read to suggest a limited exception to the Kiger

decision for those instances where a claimant is going to or from an appointment whose
location and time is set exclusively by the surety, with no input or negotiation from the
claimant, and where, if the claimant does not attend the appointment, her workers'
compensation benefits will be suspended or terminated.

This is an attractive argument

under the present facts. It is easy to relate to Claimant's plight, where she was required to
attend an IME over one hundred miles from her home, when the same doctor would be
conducting those examinations in her town the following month. Compounding the issue,
the IME was scheduled for a time when snow was certainly possible, and in fact was
falling, at least as of her return trip. All travelers on US 95 on November 15, not just
Claimant, were subjected to the same road conditions.
29.

In such a situation, it is hard not to sympathize with Claimant, and easy to

assign the risk of Claimant's travel to the surety.

However attractive, Claimant's

arguments run contrary to, and in effect overrule a valid Idaho Supreme Court case on
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point. There is no legal nexus between Claimant's industrial injury and the injuries she
suffered in the car wreck in question.

Idaho has not adopted the "quasi-course of

employment rule" invented by Professor Larson. The Workers' Compensation Act does
not provide for the "risk shifting" proposed by Claimant. It is impossible to foresee the
unintended consequences of such a rule.

Certainly, it would expand sureties'

responsibilities for coverage to a point not contemplated by the statutes. For these reasons,
Claimant is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits for her automobile accident of
November 15, 2013.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Claimant is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits for injuries suffered in a
November 15, 2013 automobile accident while returning from an IME scheduled by Surety
related to Claimant's ongoing workers' compensation claim.

RECOMMENDATION
Based

upon

the

foregoing

Findings

of Fact,

Conclusion

of Law,

and

Recommendation, the Referee recommends that the Commission adopt such findings and
conclusion as its own and issue an appropriate final order.
DATEDthis Jl/f'dayof

:f~

2014.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Michael E. Powers,eide~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2014, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND
RECOMMENDATION was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:

Iv1ICHAEL T KESSINGER
POBOX287
LEWISTON ID 83501
WYNN MOSMAN
PO BOX 8456
MOSCOW ID 83843-8456

ge
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BEFORE

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE

BARBARA KELLY,
Claimant,

IC 2013-024694

V.

BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC.,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Employer,
and
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

I hereby certify that on the 30th day of September, 2014 a true and correct copy of Referee
Michael Powers' Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation, was served by regular
United States Mail upon:
MICHAEL T KESSINGER
PO BOX287
LEWISTON ID 83501
WYNNMOSMAN
PO BOX 8456
MOSCOW ID 83843

ka

Assistant Commission Secretary

